for the acts of their employees, including Doug Bullock, based on agency (10-11-02; 1:51:22).

Coren requested to call as the first witness after Coren Estes, Lloyd Bradley, his supervisor (Bradley, dep. p. 9), who could testify to the complaints that Coren made regarding the threats from Bullock of not reaching his retirement or age discrimination (Bradley, dep., p. 9), that Bullock wrote numerous notes to Coren (Bradley, dep. p. 9), that Coren was not paid for his supper of half-hour, that he saw the "you need to be dead" message left on the tow motor (Bradley, dep. p. 9), which appeared to be Doug Bullock's hand-writing, that he went with Coren to report Coren's complaints about Respondent Bullock (Bradley, dep. p. 9), and that he was present when Coren was found unresponsive in the fire break room on August 11, 1999 (Bradley, dep. p. 11-12). The undersigned never admitted that Lloyd Bradley ("Bradley") could not make a connection between the assaults and Coren, because Bradley came to the scene of the first assault a few minutes after it happened (Bradley, dep., p. 11-12), Bradley heard Glenn Porter say "Coren was down and outside" (Bradley, dep., p. 12), Bradley saw Coren "sitting up against the wall, brick wall and we couldn't get him to" (Bradley, dep., p. 12), Bradley saw the white Styrofoam cup with what Coren had "been drinking" (Bradley, dep., p. 12), Bradley saw that the ambulance was called (Bradley, dep., p. 12), and Bradley went to his supervisors, Ed Sanders, the former Plant Manager and Glenn Porter about the complaints from Coren (Bradley, dep., p. 7, 9, 13). Bradley drew the scene of the crime or civil assault (Bradley, dep., p. 22). Bradley could identify Doug Bullock's handwriting,

because Doug made his "e's" different like a three (3) (ROA, Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatories, p. 61). Bradley identified the writing to be Doug Bullock's (Bradley, dep., p. 10). Bradley identified Doug Bullock's handwriting on the tow motor (ROA, p. 61) and conveyor belt (Bradley, dep., p. 9). The Dear God letter Doug Bullock admitted to writing it (Bullock, Dec. 12, 2001, dep., p. 18; Aug. 20, 2002, p. 40).The Court would not allow the material testimony of Lloyd Bradley (10-11-02; 2:48:46), which was an abuse of discretion and due process.

Coren then offered to call Sue Estes, Claude Tisdale (10-11-02; 2:58:55), Joe Harris, and Bob Brown (10-11-02; 2:52:04) immediately, except the undersigned informed the Trial Court that Claude Tisdale was scheduled for Court testimony by subpoena on October 12, 2002 (10-11-02; 2:59:35). The Trial Court directed the undersigned to produce Claude Tisdale immediately (10-11-02; 2:59:43-3:00:54). Then the Trial Court demanded the undersigned to subpoena Claude Tisdale to testify immediately (10-11-02; 3:04:41). The Petitioner did issue a subpoena to the Logan County Sheriff, but he could not secure Claude Tisdale's testimony within thirty (30) minutes (10-11-02; 3:04:49), as the Trial Court was unfairly demanding. This was an abuse of discretion and not due process for Coren.

Bob Brown was offered as a witness, because he knew Bullock and observed Bullock sleeping on the job. Bob Brown testified that he knew that Bullock was capable of hiring someone to commit the assaults (10-11-02; 2:52:08-2:57:00). The Trial Court stopped the testimony of Bob Brown (10-11-02; 3:05:17), and

improperly issued a stern directed verdict against Coren making explicit statements to the jury (10-11-02; 3:09:16). The undersigned stated "I have circumstantial evidence that indicates that they were all three the same persons." (10-11-02; 2:59:43). It is an abuse of discretion to **not** allow the Petitioner to present circumstantial evidence of the connection between Respondent Carpenter Company, the assaults and Bullock. Coren did not receive due process.

Respondents, Carpenter Company, Jim Guthrie (Guthrie, dep. p. 26) and Johnny Meguiar, (Meguiar, dep. pp. 40-41) did not investigate the assault on Coren, as they testified at their depositions and so would have testified at trial. Respondents Guthrie and Meguiar stated in their depositions that they destroyed the evidence of the doxylamine after the August 11, 1999 assault (Guthrie, dep. p. 58-64; Meguiar, dep. p. 30). The destruction of evidence was never addressed by the Trial Court, although the Coren raised the issue at the second Pre-trial Conference on September 23, 2002. The Russellville City Police Detective Edmonds was subpoenaed to testify for Coren at the Pre-Trial Conference on September 23, 2002 regarding the destruction of evidence (the purple liquid) from the August 11, 1999 assault. One-half of the purple liquid was sent by Detective Edmonds to the Kentucky State Police Laboratory, but the vile was not sealed and all the liquid contained therein escaped.

If Coren could have offered the testimony of Respondent Doug Bullock, Coren would have been able to show by his admissions in the writing of the letters (Coren's testimony, 10-10-02;

3:09:34), his threats on the tow motor (Coren 10-10-02; 3:09:42), on the telephone (Coren 10-11-02; 9:16:01), **his knowledge of the assailants** (Coren 10-10-02; 08:09:49), and his telephone calls since May 25, 1999 to Coren's home (Coren 10-11-02; 09:15:25) the connection between Coren, the assailants and Bullock. Coren testified that he recognized the voice of Doug Bullock when he called Coren's home on May 25, 1999 (Coren 10-11-02; 09:16:00). Coren testified that Doug said, "You will not reach retirement" during the May 25, 1999 telephone call (Coren 10-11-02; 09:15:49).

If Glenn Porter could have testified, he could have informed the Trial Court and jury of the code that Coren and Glen had worked out for Coren's safety (Porter, August 20, 2002, dep. pp. 9, 17; December 12, 2001, p. 6-7), when Coren reported to him that he was endanger and he would not reach his retirement due to the Doug Bullock threats (Porter, December 12, 2001, dep., p. 6-7; August 20, 2002, dep. pp. 9, 17). Glen Porter knew of no investigation of the tow motor threats and the August 11, 1999 assaults (Porter, December 12, 2001, dep., p. 9-11; August 20, 2002, dep. p. 12). Glenn knew the connections between the Respondent Carpenter Company and the assaults by what Coren told him prior to working out the code (Porter, August 20, 2002, dep. p. 9, 17). Glenn knew that Coren thought he "wasn't going to make it to his retirement" (Porter, December 12, 2001, dep., p. 15). Coren told Glenn "that somebody was out to get him" (Porter, December 12, 2001, dep., p. 15-6). Glenn Porter's testimony is one of the connections between Respondent Carpenter Company and the assaults. Hence, it was an

abuse of discretion to not allow his testimony and clearly erroneous. Coren did not receive a due process.

Coren requested to have the testimony of Sue Estes, Coren's wife, to state what Claude Tisdale said to her on the telephone that the August 11, 1999 assault "was not of natural causes" (Sue Estes, dep. p. 49). The Petitioner offered many other witnesses to testified as listed in his Pre-Trial Compliance (ROA, 551-561). Sheila Scruggs, Coren's only daughter, would testify as to the pictures she took of the condition of the house on December 19, 2001 that Coren described to the jury (Coren, 10-11-02; 1:44:44; S. Scruggs, dep. p. 16-20; ROA 551-561), the physical and emotional damages her father incurred (S. Scruggs, dep. p. 21-23), and the telephone call she received from Carpenter Company on April 8, 2002 at the her home (Scruggs, dep. p. 12). Sheila's husband, Jim Scruggs and her son, Tyler Scruggs, could have testified as to the telephone call of April 8, 2002 (ROA 551-561; T. Scruggs, dep. p. 5-9) and the damages to Coren and Sue Estes (ROA 551-561; T. Scruggs, dep. p. 23-25), as could Richard and Ronald Estes, the Petitioner's two sons (ROA 551-561).

Charles Orange, Logan County Commonwealth Attorney, was offered to testify as to the removal of Coren's vehicle from Carpenter Company property, the harassment that Coren received at Carpenter Company and reported to Charles, and his knowledge of the December 19, 2001 assault (ROA 551-561). Fred Smotherman (Smotherman, dep. pp. 11-16), Willis Shores (Shores, dep. pp. 24-35), and Roger Duncan (Duncan, dep. pp. 12, 14-20, 22-23, 28-9)

would prove the circumstances of the December 19, 2001 assault and the connections with Carpenter Company and Doug Bullock (ROA 551-561). Fred Smotherman would have testified as to his observation of an old black Chevrolet truck "casing the joint", which he and Coren saw in the area of Coren's home and Fred's home (Smotherman, dep., p. 19), the telephone calls he received after the December 19, 2001 assault and the lights on his home (ROA 551-561; Smotherman, dep. p. 19). Willis Shores would testify that it was 9:52 a.m. when he heard the doorbell ring at Coren's house and looked up at his wall clock to see that it was not his wall clock that was chiming at 9:52 a.m. (Shores, dep., p. 25). Willis described the shuffling and scuffling that he heard over the telephone (Shores, dep., p. 63). Willis Shores said he could hear the "tone of the voice, the sound of the voice, the form of the voice, the way it was muffled, and then his response was in no way imaginable [sic]. There were [sic] definitely two people." (Shores, dep., p. 64). Willis heard Coren say "Wait a minute, my doorbell is ringing; I've got to go to the front door." (Shores, dep., p. 27). Then someone not Coren said "Mr. Estes, (a muffled sound) has sent you a Christmas present." (Shores, dep. p. 28). Coren's response was "What did you say?" The voice response was "Mr. Estes, blank, has sent you a Christmas present." Willis then heard shuffling and scuffling. Then Coren said "Get out of here," real loud. Willis heard more shuffling and scuffling. (Shores, dep., p. 28). Willis telephoned Fred Smotherman. Willis told Fred there was trouble at Coren's house (Smotherman, dep., p. 11). Fred went to Coren's house and found Coren flushed, holding his stomach, and not walking straight or staggering

(Smotherman, dep., p. 12). Fred described Coren as conscious, but addled (Smotherman, dep., p. 15). Coren was taken to Logan Memorial Hospital where he was semi-conscious (Vol. II, p. 263), when they pumped his stomach. Sue Estes was very insistent that the liquid from Coren's stomach be tested, and the hospital took blood and urine. Logan County Sheriff Wallace Whittaker personally carried the blood and urine directly to the Kentucky State Police Laboratory after the December 19, 2001 assault. The liquid was tested to be doxylamine (See proposed Trial Exhibit – KSP Lab Report, ROA 551-561; Appellant's Court of Appeals' Brief, Exhibit 4-1). All this testimony was ignored as part of the connections between Respondent Carpenter Company and the assaults by the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Kentucky Supreme Court. Coren offered to establish the causal link, but the Trial Court refused to hear said witnesses, i.e., Lloyd Bradley, Claude Tisdale, Sue Estes, etc. (10-11-02; 11:04:15-11:13:27). Coren did not have a due process trial.

Coren offered the testimony of David Kitchens and Logan County Sheriff Wallace Whittaker to prove the assault of December 19, 2001 and March 18, 2002 based on their investigation (ROA 551-561). Logan County Sheriff Wallace Whittaker personally took the purple liquid to the Kentucky State Police Laboratory in Madisonville, Kentucky after the December 19, 2001 and March 18, 2002 assaults on Coren, which was determined to be doxylamine (an over the counter-sleeping medication or unisom) (Petitioner's Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief, Exhibits 4- 1 and 2 – Toxicology Analysis Reports of 3-6-02 and 7-25-02, respectively).

The doxylamine evidence proved the connection and same modus operandi.

Coren offered the testimony of Detective Kenneth Edmunds regarding the investigation of the August 11, 1999, the failure of Respondents Carpenter Company, Jim Guthrie and Johnny Meguiar to investigate the liquid and the destruction of the liquid from August 11, 1999 (ROA 551-561). Coren offered Jerry Smith's testimony to testify that Coren made complaints to Jerry Smith, a Kentucky State Police officer, regarding being run off the road (ROA 551-561). Coren offered Clay Wagner and Bobby Huffines to prove the telephone calls to Coren's home were coming from (270) 726-2431, a Carpenter Company telephone number (ROA 551-561). Jesse Riley, Coren's lifelong attorney, could testify that he was employed by Respondent Carpenter Company as an attorney and that he told Coren he could not represent him as he was employed by Respondent Carpenter Company (ROA 551-561). All these witnesses would verify what Coren had testified about, but they were not allowed to testify, which was an abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous and Coren did not receive a due process fair trial.

Dr. Max Kinnaman's testimony was offered to prove that Coren had suffered damages and that Coren suffers Post Traumatic Stress Disorder due to the assaults from Carpenter Company (ROA 551-561). Wilford Duncan was offered to testify as to the effects of the ingestion of doxylamine based on a reasonable pharmaceutical probability (ROA 551-561). Doxylamine or unisom is lethal if taken in sufficient quantities. Neither of these experts was allowed to

testify as to Coren's damages, which was an abuse of discretion and it was clearly erroneous, but it was never discussed in the Court of Appeals' decision.

Other Carpenter Company employees were offered to prove the notes, letters, threats of death, and not able to reach retirement statements that came from Doug Bullock or the connection between Bullock, Coren and the assaults. The Carpenter employees offered were Elmer Lack, Bobby Huffines, David Logan Bilyeu, Bobby Atchley, Don Broyles, Naomi Berry, Elmer Anderson, Joe Harris, and others (ROA 551-561). Coren offered the testimony of David Keith Dennison to show the connection between Doug Bullock and the e-mail that Coren received (ROA 551-561), which would have shown circumstantial evidence of the connection between the Respondent Carpenter Company and the assaults and Coren's assailants. The undersigned never admitted that Coren could not make a connection between the assaults and Coren, rather the undersigned said that she had circumstantial evidence to present (10-11-02; 12:59:30) at approximately 10:00 a.m., but t Trial Court refused to hear it. This was not due process.

The Respondent, Carpenter Company was and is responsible for the acts of its agents. Assuming the Respondents would testify consistent with their depositions, Respondent Jim Gu hrie, Carpenter's Russellville, Kentucky plant manager from March 3, 1997 (Guthrie dep., p. 9) to present, and Respondent Johnny Meguiar, divisional manager (Meguiar dep., p. 10), did not investigate Doug Bullock (Meguiar dep., p. 38-41) and destroyed

evidence, i.e., the liquid that Coren was forced to drink at the Carpenter Company on August 11, 1999 (Meguiar dep., p. 30, Guthrie dep., p. 61-63). Carpenter requested one-half of the purple liquid from the August 11, 1999 assault, but it did remind. If the liquid had not been destroyed by the Respondent Carpenter Company, it would prove that the liquid Coren was forced to drink on August 11, 1999 was the same liquid he was forced to drink the two other assaults. Since the Respondent Carpenter Company employee, Meguiar and Guthrie threw the liquid away; the Respondent Carpenter Company did cover-up the assault, which should have caused the Trial Court to allow testimony of this cover-up. Why did Carpenter destroy the purple liquid from the first assault and claim they had a policy for one-half of the liquid, when no such policy existed, which was stated at the last pre-trial conference the Respondents' attorney (Guthrie, dep. p. 58-64; Mequiar, dep., p. 30)? But, the destruction of evidence issue was not addressed by the Trial Court; therefore, Coren did not receive a due process trial.

Respondent Doug Bullock sent letters, messages and wrote "you need to be dead" on the tow motor Coren was to use on July 14, 1998 (Estes, March 1, 2001, dep. p. 58-59; 10-11-02; 1:12:54; ROA, 773-777), which were harassing communications. Bullock did not like an older man on the second shift telling him what to do by notes. The assailant told Coren that Bullock was the one they were doing this for on August 11, 1999, by saying "Go tell Dougie, we have got him." (Coren, March 1, 2001, dep., p. 37; ROA, 773-777), "on December 19, 2001, "I have a Christmas present for you from

Bullock," (Coren, June 27, 2002, dep., p. 228; ROA, 773-777), and on March 18, 2002, "you know the drill" (Coren, June 27, 2002, dep. p. 270; ROA, 773-777). Coren testified at trial and in deposition that he recognized Doug's voice on the telephone when Doug said, "you will not reach retirement" (Coren, 10-11-02; 09:15:49; ROA, 773-777). The Respondent Guthrie and Meguiar were the decision-makers that determined not to investigate Coren's complaints regarding threats or written statements that he would not retire. Hence, the Respondent Carpenter Company is liable for the failure to investigate, the cover-up and destruction of evidence, which shows a connection between the Respondents and the assaults on Coren.

Glenn Porter worked out an emergency code with Coren, because Glenn was afraid for Coren's life (Porter, August 20, 2002, dep., pp. 9, 17; December 12, 2001 dep., pp. 6-7). Their code proved the connection with Carpenter (Porter, August 20, 2002, dep., p. 9, 17), because Glenn admitted Coren said "that somebody was out to get him" after Coren had complained to Glenn about Bullock (Porter, December 12, 2001, dep., p. 15-6). This proved the connection between Bullock and Carpenter and the assailants, but the Trial Court would not give Coren due process to admit this evidence.

Coren offered to present the facts in a condensed form for the jury to follow, but the Court would not allow an exhibit of the summary of the events (See Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief Exhibit 1 – Summary of Events; ROA, 773-777) to reach the jury during the trial, which was an abuse of discretion and not due

process. Because the Trial Court directed a verdict after only three (3) witnesses, many exhibits were not entered into the record that proved the connection requested by the Court, the assaults, age discrimination and damages, which resulted in an abuse of discretion (See Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief Exhibit 1- Summary of Events; ROA, 773-777; and Exhibit 2 – Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits).

All three (3) assaults on Coren involved one assailant that was the same each time, although there were two assailants at Carpenter and on December 19, 2001 at Coren's house (10-11-02; 9:53:49; 1:53:48; 1:53:55). The assailants should not have to be tracked down, but at trial Coren had a clear description of each assailant, that is one being black, wearing a ski mask, wore a Carhart jacket two (2) times, same gun each time, same purple liquid later determined to be doxylamine, cotton gloves two times, and same voice each time (10-11-02; 10:43:50) and the other man was white, small frame, short, and talked with a local accent. Willis Shores heard the black assailant on December 19, 2001, but the Trial Court would not allow that testimony to be presented (ROA, 659-664, Order Concerning Admissibility of Proffered Evidence, p. 5). This issue was preserved for appeal, because Coren filed a Motion in Limine, which include a Memorandum regarding the hearsay issue (ROA, 642-658).

At the August 11, 1999 assault the black assailant said "Go tell Dougie we have got him." The Kentucky Court of Appeals determined this statement was admissible, but then the Court of Appeals concluded it was harmless error (Appendix Ky. Court of

Appeals Opinion, p. 19). At the December 19, 2001 assault on Coren at his house the assailant said "Mr. Estes, Doug Bullock has sent you a Christmas present." The Court of Appeals clearly erroneously determined that said statement was hearsay and it is not a statement against penal interest (Appendix Ky. Court of Appeals Opinion p. 12). At the March 18, 2002 assault on Coren at his house the assailant said "You know the drill." The Kentucky Court of Appeals determined correctly that this statement was non-hearsay and the Circuit Court erred, but determined it was harmless error, which is clearly erroneous (Appendix Ky. Court of Appeals Opinion p. 13).

Coren filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on March 26, 2002 (ROA, 196-99), after the third assault on March 18, 2002 on Coren. The undersigned filed an Entry of Appearance on March 19, 2002 (ROA, 193), the date of the undersigned's first scheduled conference with Coren. The undersigned conferred with Coren's family, because Coren was in the hospital. There was potentially irreparable harm from ingestion of doxylamine, which Coren was forced to drink at gun point three times. At the April 19, 2002 hearing the undersigned was intimidated by Trial Judge Gill, if she said the assailants were not agents of the Defendants/Respondents (3-27-02; 11:02:00). Why did Coren's assault occur one day prior to obtaining an attorney as ordered by the Trial Court? Was Bullock attempting to prevent Coren from obtaining an attorney? Why was Bullock sent on a vacation just after the August 11, 1999 assault (Bullock, August 20, 2002, dep., pp. 49-50)?

Coren was nervous when he was testifying and inadvertently made statements that the Trial Court declared were hearsay, that is what the assailants were stating to him (10-11-02; 9:57:00). Coren was then "browbeat" by the Trial Court in front of the jury, when he more than admonished Coren that he would be found in contempt of Court, if he violated the Court Order not to testify as to the assailants' hearsay statements. This was an abuse of discretion and not due process.

Age Discrimination. Coren stated the problem between he and Bullock was Coren's age, which was the substantial motivating factor that caused Coren's adverse employment, i.e., the assault on the job (10-11-02; 1:33:44). Coren established the link between the first assault and Bullock, as an employee at Carpenter in Coren's "summary of events" chart (ROA, 773-777; Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 1 – Summary of Events), which includes all the age motivated incidences and Coren's complaints to his supervisor and bosses above the supervisor, Meguiar and Guthrie. Respondent Doug Bullock sent letters, messages and wrote "you need to be dead" on the tow motor Coren was to use on July 14, 1998 (Estes, March 1, 2001, dep. p. 58-59; 10-11-02; 1:12:54), which were harassing communications or a hostile work environment. Bullock did not like an older lead man on the second shift telling him what to do by notes.

Coren testified that he reported the complaints to Lloyd Bradley (10-11-02; 9:29:25), Respondent Jim Guthrie (10-11-02; 9:29:39) and Respondent Johnny Meguiar (10-11-02; 2:14:35), but

Jim Guthrie and Johnny Meguiar did nothing to investigate the complaints, including but not limited to death threats from Bullock, which was a violation of the statute, KRS 344.040. Respondent Carpenter Company, Jim Guthrie, and Johnny Meguiar had a duty to investigate Coren's complaints that resulted in the assaults pursuant to KRS 344.040 (See ROA, 773-777; Appellant's Brief Exhibit 1 – Summary of Events).

Coren testified that his lost wages were one (1) hour on August 11, 1999 and eight (8) hours on August 12, 1999 (10-11-02; 3:06:20), which Respondent Carpenter Company did not pay, which was adverse employment action. Coren testified that Respondent Doug Bullock was paid for his one-half (½) hour lunch (10-11-02; 3:50:01). Bob Brown's affined that he saw Doug Bullock sleeping during his lunch half-hour, but Doug was paid for working during his lunch half-hour, while Coren was not paid for his lunch hour and he did not sleep on the job. Coren testified he was training his replacement on August 9, 1999 (10-11-02; 9:50:05), who was younger than he was. This is the *prima facie* case for age discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed2d. 105 (2000). Hence, there was sufficient evidence for the elements of age discrimination and the connection between Bullock, Carpenter and the assailants of Coren. It was an abuse of discretion to exclude Bradley's testimony and other proposed witnesses and a denial of due process.

Appeals. The Trial Court entered a Judgment for the Defendants on October 16, 2002 (ROA 848-854). Coren filed a

Motion to Set Aside, Alter, Amend or Vacate the Judgment entered on October 16, 2002 (ROA 870-918). A final and appealable Order was entered on December 13, 2002 denying the Motion to Vacate, Alter or Amend (ROA 935). A Notice of Appeal was filed on January 10, 2003 regarding the Judgment of October 16, 2002 and December 13, 2002 (ROA 936-937). The Respondent filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on January 24, 2003 (ROA 940-941). The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on November 19, 2004 to affirm the direct appeal. Coren filed a Motion for Discretionary Review with the Kentucky Supreme Court, but it was denied (Appendix - Order Denying Discretionary Review) on September 14, 2005. Coren files this Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 13, 2005.

ARGUMENT I

PETITIONER PROVED THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HIM AND BULLOCK, BUT THE COURTS HAVE IGNORED THE FACTS AND FAILED TO PROVIDE COREN WITH DUE PROCESS.

These issues were preserved for appeal, because the Petitioner filed a Motion in Limine on the issue of hearsay (ROA, 9-0-2); objected to the Directed Verdict entered *sua sponte* on the second day of trial; filed Motion to Set Aside, Alter, Amend or Vacate the Judgment filed on October 16, 2002 (ROA 870-918); and this Appeal followed. Coren offered to establish the causal link, but the Trial Court refused to hear witnesses, i.e., Lloyd Bradley, Claude Tisdale, Sue Estes, etc. on the second day of trial. (10-11-02; 11:04:15-11:13:27). The undersigned said that she had

circumstantial evidence to present (10-11-02; 12:59:30) at approximately 10:00 a.m., on October 11, 2002, but the Trial Court refused to allow the trial to go forward. Coren has claimed he did not receive due process from the second day of trial.

The Trial Court, Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court ignored the facts presented by the Petitioner that there was a connection between Respondent Bullock and the assailants, as above discussed. First, the statements which are preserved in deposition and trial testimony from the August 11, 1999 assault at the Respondent Carpenter Company of "Go tell Dougie we have got him," proved that Doug Bullock had a connection with the assault upon Coren. Also, the statement on March 18, 2002, at Coren's home of "you know the drill," connected up the three (3) assaults, because Coren was expected to do the same all three (3) times, that is, drink the purple liquid, determined to be doxylamine the last two times. Hence, it was not harmless error as determined by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that these two statements were not admitted into the record, which is clearly erroneous and a lack of due process. U.S. Const., Amend. V and XIV; Ky. Const. § 2; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

Second, Respondent Bullock had threatened Coren so many times before the assaults. There were four "you need to be dead" type statements from Respondent Bullock received by Coren. The "e" could easily be identified by Coren and Bradley each time. How many death threats does it take for the lower courts to determine there is a connection between Bullock and Coren's assaults? The

death threats were "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment." Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 825 (6th Cir. 1997). It was an abuse of discretion, clearly erroneously and a lack of due process for the courts to not so determine. Goldberg.

ARGUMENT II

TWO ASSAILANT STATEMENTS ARE ADMISSIBLE, WHICH PROVES THAT THERE WAS A CONNECTION BETWEEN BULLOCK AND THE ASSAULTS ON COREN AND IT IS A LACK OF DUE PROCESS TO NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENTS IN THE EVIDENCE.

Since these two statements are admissible, then the Court of Appeals ignored the facts that are similar in all three incidents. This is clearly erroneous and a lack of due process.

The similarities of the three (3) assaults were: the same black male approximately 5'10" to 6' weighing 230 to 240 pounds, the same voice, ski masks each time, the same or similar gun was used each time to force Coren to drink the same bitter liquid, each time the black male makes a reference to Doug Bullock or the third time "you know the drill," obviously the black male knows Coren each time, the last two (2) times the black male was wearing the brown Carthart jacket with darker brown corduroy collar, the last two (2) times the cup was removed from the scene when they knew the contents could be tested as they were on August 11, 1999, and the first and third times the black male was wearing tan gloves (Coren, 10-11-02;

10:58:16). The last two (2) assaults happened similar times of the day 9:52 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. respectively. This indicates that the old black Chevrolet truck was "casing the joint" to know what time Coren came into the house from doing his morning farm work. These similarities show a "connection" with Doug Bullock.

The two statements should have been admitted, because they prove the connection between Bullock and the assaults on Coren. It was an abuse of discretion and a lack of due process to not include two of the statements in the evidence. Goldberg.

ARGUMENT III

COREN COULD PROVE AGE DISCRIMINATION; THEREFORE IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND A LACK OF DUE PROCESS FOR THE JURY NOT TO RECEIVE THE CASE.

The lower Court decisions were clearly erroneous, because the courts ignored the facts presented by Coren that would overcome a directed verdict decision. Based on the case cited by the Trial Court, Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Company, Ky. App., 37 S.W.3d 770, 775 (2000), Coren herein is similar to Vanceburg Utilities. The court in Lambert determined that Vanceburg Utilities "did not clearly and definitively establish that the appellants could not prove" their case. Id. Similarly, Coren can "clearly and definitively establish" that he can prove his case given the opportunity.

The Lambert court cited the case of Lovins v. Napier, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 921, 922 (1991) which held "the trial court is required to 'consider the evidence in its strongest light in favor of the party against whom the motion was made and must give him the advantage of every fair and reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify.'" Id. The Court herein must give Coren a fair and reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify. The Court must reverse the lower court decisions and allow Coren to have a new fair trial, pursuant to CR 50.01(a).

In Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky. App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985), [Mason v. Keltner, Ky. App., 854 S.W.2d 780, 782 (1992); discretionary review denied] the Court wrote:

> In ruling on either a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a trial court is under a duty to consider the evidence in the strongest possible light in favor of the party opposing the motion. Furthermore, it is required to give the opposing party the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence. And, it is precluded from entering either a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. **unless there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue in the action**, or if no disputed issue of fact exists upon which reasonable men could differ. [Emphasis added.]

The Court herein must give Coren a fair and reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify. Coren must be allowed to have a new

fair trial, pursuant to CR 50.01(a), because he met his burden of proof, which is a reasonable and fair inference.

The Court removed this case from the jury without giving Coren sufficient time and opportunity to develop his proof. When the Court demanded one witness to prove the entire case, this was an abuse of discretion against Coren. Also, to expect Coren to produce Claude Tisdale on one-half hour notice is unfair to Coren. The Court is almost all-powerful, but that power can be wheeled improperly unfairly and without giving Coren herein a fair day in court. The Court of Appeals determined, "After the trial court has made its decision, the reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous." (Kentucky Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 5; Davis v. Graviss, **Ky., 672 S.W.2d 933 (1984). The Trial Court's directed verdict was clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals should have so find.** It was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to not allow evidence of the connection and age discrimination to reach the jury. Coren did not receive due process.

Coren was able to prove age discrimination. It was clearly erroneous and a lack of due process to determine that Coren did not prove the element of adverse employment action in the age discrimination proof. Coren did meet his burden of proof with Coren's testimony only to establish a *prima facie* case of: (1) a member of a protected class, since he was over age 40; (2) he was otherwise qualified for the position of lead man; (3) he received adverse employment action – assault on the job, lost wages of nine

hours; and (4) the Respondent hired someone to replace him that was younger. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2006 (2000). Coren testified he received adverse employment action by his failure to be paid for the nine (9) hours between August 11, 1999 at 10:00 p.m. through August 12, 1999 and by his sustaining three (3) assaults (10-11-12; 1:02:39). The Respondents did not investigate Coren's complaints of Respondent Doug Bullock. Bullock did not work during his lunchtime, but slept in 1998 as seen by Brown (10-11-12; 2:20:33). This case is an older man telling Bullock, the younger man, what to do on occasions (10-11-02; 11:12:12), and Bullock retaliated with assaults. It was a lack of due process to not so find. Goldberg.

ARGUMENT IV

COREN COULD PROVE THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ASSAULTS AND BULLOCK/CARPENTER; THEREFORE IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND A LACK OF DUE PROCESS FOR THE JURY NOT TO RECEIVE THE CASE.

The lower courts ignored the connection between the assaults and the Respondent Carpenter Company. This was clearly erroneous and a lack of due process. The facts that connect Carpenter to the assaults are the fact that Glenn Porter worked out a code with Coren Estes after he saw the death threat signs and heard Coren express his fear that he would not reach retirement. Glenn Porter knew the threats were coming from Doug Bullock, either from the hand writing or Coren's complaints. Another fact that proves a

connection with Carpenter Company and the assaults was that the Respondent Carpenter Company's telephone number was used to call Coren Estes from number 726-2431 by Respondent Bullock. Coren recognized his voice. Bobby Huffines knew the telephone number was used by Respondent Bullock at the Respondent Carpenter Company. Jennie Tellis in deposition stated that the second trunk line hunting group first number is 726-2431 and the 726-2431 is the first number to be used in that hunting system at the Respondent Carpenter Company (10-11-02; 9:15:36). The jury should have been allowed to hear the Bell South representative's statement of the 726-2431 number. The 726-2431 number was used by Bullock to threaten Coren to not reach retirement. It was an abuse of discretion and lack of due process for the Trial Court to grant a directed verdict. Goldberg.

The employer is liable for the acts of the agent, because the agent was aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency § 219(2)(3)(A.L.I. 1957). Id. at 692. Vicarious liability for misuse of supervisory authority is the principle held in American General Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hall, Ky., 74 S.W.3d 688 (2002). Both Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed. 2d 633 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) held that "[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor over the employee." Ellerth and Faragher created employer liability for the acts of the employee, while the older

Kentucky case of Ellinger v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1043 (W.D. Ky. 1997) held that the individual was not liable for the acts as an employee under the Civil Rights statute. Bullock created a hostile work environment as the day-shift lead man of the bale room by the notes, letters, and messages he left for Coren, for example "you need to be dead." Guthrie and Meguiar supervised Bullock and hence Carpenter Company and all three (3) are vicariously liable to the victimized employee, Coren, for the actionable hostile work environment created by Bullock, Meguiar and Guthrie. Meguiar and Guthrie could have stopped Bullock but they chose not to so do, which was a violation of KRS 344.040. Coren should not have to track down the assailants and present their testimony.

ARGUMENT V

THE COURTS NOT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS.

The lower courts ignored the facts of the destruction of evidence by the Respondent Carpenter Company. The reason that the Respondent Carpenter Company, by its agents Respondent Johnny Meguiar and Respondent Jim Guthrie, gave one-half of the doxylamine to Detective Kenneth Edmunds, but he sent it to the State Police Laboratory without sealing the vile; therefore, one-half of the liquid was destroyed and not tested. The other one-half of the August 11, 1999 liquid was retained at the Respondent Carpenter Company at first due to a policy for retention of the liquid, but at the second pre-trial conference Judge Gill inquired of Respondent Johnny Meguiar if such a policy existed and he said no. The second

one-half of the liquid was not retained, because it was not sealed. Hence, the Respondent successfully destroyed the liquid from August 11, 1999. The Respondents Carpenter Company, Johnny Mequiar and Jim Guthrie must be held responsible for their actions of destruction of evidence or it is clearly erroneous to not so do and a lack of due process. Goldberg.

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner requests the United States Supreme Court to:

1. Grant the Petition;
2. For Oral Arguments;
3. Remand this case for a due process trial on the issue of age discrimination; and
4. For any and all relief the Court determines the Petitioner is entitled.

This the 13th day of December, 2005.



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(Admission Pending)

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2004-SC-1100-D

(2003)-CA-0090-MR & 2003-CA-0190-MR)

COREN ESTES MOVANT

V. LOGAN CIRCUIT COUT

2000-CI-0341

CARPENTER COMPANY; JIM GUTHRIE;
JOHNNY MEGUIAR; AND DOUG BULLOCK

RESPONDENTS

ORDER DENYING DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

The Motion to strike the response is denied.

The Motion for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals is also denied.

ENTERED: SEPTEMBER 14, 2005.

/s/ JOSEPH E. LAMBERT

RENDERED: November 19, 2004; 2:00 P.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth Of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

No. 2003-CA-000090-MR

AND

NO. 2003-CA- 000190-MR

CORENESTES

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

v.

APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT, HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CI-00341

CARPENTER COMPANY; JIM GUTHRIE;
JOHNNY MEGUIAR[1]; AND DOUG BULLOCK

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

OPINION

1. AFFIRMING DIRECT APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-000090-MR
2. DISMISSING CROSS-APPEL NO. 2003-CA-000190-MR-AS MOOT

** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES.

MINTON, JUDGE: Coren Estes appeals following directed verdict entered in favor of his former employer, Carpenter Company ("Carpenter"), as well as Jim Guthrie, Johnny Meguiar, and Doug Bullock (collectively "the appellees"). Estes was the victim of a series of bizarre assaults which he alleges were orchestrated by Bullock, another employee of Carpenter. Bullock's alleged involvement served as the basis for several theories of liability against Carpenter and its managers, Guthrie and Meguiar. The circuit court directed a verdict in favor of the appellees when it became convinced after two days of trial that there was no evidence connecting Bullock and the assaults. We are similarly convinced. So we affirm the dismissal.

THE SERIES OF ASSAULTS

Estes alleges that on three occasions, he was accosted[2] by one or two masked individuals[3] who brandished a gun and forced him to drink a liquid containing doxylamine[4] which caused him to lose consciousness. The first assault happened on Carpenter's premises on August 11, 1999, the day before Estes was to retire. The second and third assaults occurred after Estes's retirement on December 19, 2001, and March 18, 2002, at his home. Estes alleges that Bullock was somehow behind the assaults. He then builds upon

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[1] Johnny Meguiar's name is misspelled as "McGuire" thoughout the record.

[2] There was some dispute before trial about whether these assaults actually occurred. Our resolution of the issues on appeal assumes that these assaults did occur as Estes describes them, so this factual question is irrelevant for our purposes.

[3] Estes says there was one common assailant involved in all three assaults. There was also a second assailant who participated on in the first assault.

that to allege liability on the part of Carpenter, based on theories of age discrimination, negligence, and *respondeat superior*.

THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY ESTES

The only evidence Estes proffered to connect Bullock to the assaults is three utterances[5] of the unknown assailants.[6] Estes says that during the first assault, he heard on assailant say to the other, "Go tell Dougie we have got him." Estes says that during the second assault, the assailant said, "Mr. Estes, Doug Bullock has sent you a Christmas present." During the third assault, the assailant said, "You know the drill." The admissibility of these specific utterances was challenged before trial in the appellees' motion in *limine*. It was discussed at length in a pretrial hearing, and Estes filed a memorandum citing reasons in support of admitting these utterances into evidence at trial. Ultimately, the circuit court ordered that these utterances be excluded from trial on the grounds that they are [2]hearsay no falling within any applicable exceptions. Because this specific evidentiary issue was fairly brought to the attention of the

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[4]Doxylamine is an antihistamine which causes drowsiness. It is used by itself as a sleep aid (under the brand name Unisom) or in combination with decongestants to treat cold symptoms.

[5]We use the somewhat awkward term "utterances" rather than "statements" because "statement" is a term of art within the meaning of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) regarding hearsay. See KRE 801 (a). Whether these utterances are statements is an issue before this court.

[6]On appeal, Estes has barraged this Court with endless facts which are offered ostensibly to connect the assaults with Bullock. For example, the assailant wore the same jacket in two of the assaults, and late 1970's to early 1980's model Chevrolet pickup was seen in front of Estes's house prior to the second and third assaults. While this type of evidence is relevant to showing a common assailant, none of it in any way implicates Bullock.

circuit court before trial, we find that it is preserved or appellate review.[7]

THE DIRECTED VERDICT BEFORE ESTES CLOSED HIS CASE

Estes asserts that the circuit court erred by excluding these three utterances which he believes ultimately led to the circuit court to grant a directed verdict in error. The circuit court granted a directed verdict in the appellees' favor after two days of trial but before the end of Estes's proof. After the second day of trial, the circuit court called the lawyers to the bench for a conference. Noting that none of Estes's evidence presented thus far had connected the assaults to Bullock, the circuit court asked Estes's counsel if she believed, in good faith, that any of the remaining witnesses[8] could do so. Perceiving her answer in the negative, the circuit court entered a directed verdict in the appellees' favor. While it is unusual for a court to direct a verdict prior to the close of a party's evidence, a court my do so in the unique situation where "the evidence clearly and definitely discloses no cause of action."[9] Even if a court were to grant a directed verdict prematurely, the court's judgment may not be set aside if its ruling was harmless error.[10]

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[7]Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 103; Tucker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1996).

8 Estes had listed approximately fifty witnesses on his witness list.

9 Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., Ky. App., 37 S.W.3d 770, 774-775 (2000).

10 Id. at 775.

11 Myers v. Chapman Printing Co., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814, 821 (1992).

An appellate court reviewing a grant of a directed verdict must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences and deductions drawn from the evidence which support the claim of the prevailing party.[11] After the trial court has heard evidence on an issue squarely presented before it and has made its decision, the reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.[12]

DISCUSSION OF ESTES'S PROFFERD EVIDENCE

On appeal, Estes concedes that the utterances are hearsay but asserts that the trial court erred by not admitting them under KRE 804 (3)[13] as statements against declarant's interest. The definition of hearsay is familiar: "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."[14] However, less attention is paid to the fact that "statement" is further defined as "(1) An oral or written assertion; or (2) Nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion."[15] KRE 801 closely parallels Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.[16] The Advisory

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12 Davis v. Graviss, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 928, 933 (1984).

13 Before trial, Estes also raised two other theories regarding why the utterances are admissible. He asserted that they are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth but, rather, for their significance as verbal acts or to show his state of mind at the time of the assaults. Estes subsequently abandoned these arguments.

14 KRE 801 (c).

15 KRE 801 (a).

16 Fed. Rules Evid. (FRE) 801 (a) – 801 (c) and KRE 801 (a) – 801 (c) are substantively identical, containing only subtle differences in punctuation and capitalization.

Committee Note on FRE 801 (a) explains the importance of intent as follows: "The effect of the definitions of 'statement' is to exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an assertion. The key to the definition is that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one."[17] The Kentucky Supreme Court has also recognized that the focus under KRE 801 (a) is on the intent of the speaker or actor.[18] With this definition in mind, we will examine each of the three utterances to see if it meets the definition of hearseay[19] and, if so, whether it falls within the hearsay exception for statements against the declarant's interest. In the interest of convenience, we will not limit ourselves to addressing each in the chronological order in which it was made.

"MR. ESTES, DOUG BULLOCK HAS SENT YOU A CHRISTMAS PRESENT."

Estes asserts that during the second assault, which occurred shortly before Christmas, the assailant said, "Mr. Estes, Doug Bullock has sent you a Christmas present," The "Christmas present" referred to was the liquid containing doxylamine which Estes was

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17 Fed. R. Evid. 801, Advisory Committee Note to subdivision (a) (1973).
18 Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.05 [5] at 569-570 (4th ed. 2003) (citing as an example, Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1996)). All references to Lawson refer to the fourth edition of The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook unless otherwise indicated.
19 Because there is no question that all three utterances were made out of court, we need not address that part of the definition.
20 Just as using the term "statement" presupposes that the utterance in question is intended to make an assertion, using the term "declarant" presupposes that the speaker in question is making a statement. See KRE 801 (a), (b). Therefore, we will use the generic term "speaker" where there is a question about whether the utterance is a statement.
21 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 250, at 112 n.29 (5th ed. 1999).

then forced to drink. This utterance is a statement within the meaning of KRE 801 (a) because the declarant[20] is asserting as a matter of fact that Doug Bullock has sent Estes the liquid containing doxylamine. The fact that the phrase "Christmas present" is sarcastically metaphorical, rather than literal, does not alter the assertive nature of the utterance since its meaning is easily discernible.[21] The admissibility of this out-of-court statement depends on the purpose for which it is offered. Estes sought to introduce this statement to show that Bullock sent the assailant to his door with the drug (and presumably the orders to forcibly administer the drug). This is the truth of the matter asserted, the very use of hearsay which is forbidden.[22]

Estes Asserts that this statement falls under the hearsay exception KRE 804 (b) (3) as a statement against declarant's penal interest. In its order ruling on the motion in *limine* to exclude all three utterances, the circuit court employed the following analysis of KRE 804 (b) (3), which we adopt, at lease with respect to the statement, "Mr. Estes, Doug Bullock has sent you a Christmas present":

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22 See KRE 801, 802.

23 See, e.g., Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.45 IV (3rd ed. 1993) (citation format altered from parenthetical citation in original).

24 Unlike KRE 804 9b) (3), FRE 804 (b) (3) requires corroborating circumstances only where the statement tending to expose the declaring to criminal liability is offered to exculpate the accused.

25 See United States v. Seely, 892 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1124-1125 (4th Cir. 1982); and United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F. 2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Massachusetts v. Drew, 489 N.E. 2d 1233, 1240-1241 (Mass. 1986) (applying Massachusetts common law which adopted the principles of FRE 804 (b) (3).

26 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 319 AT 328.

Under this exception two requirements must be met. The first is meant to establish the necessity of the proffered testimony and the second is to establish its trustworthiness.

Under this rule the declarant must be:

1) "unavailable" as a witness as defined by KRE 804 (a). Under this rule, "unavailability as a witness" includes the situation in which the declarant [the only possible applicable subsection is KRE 804 (a) (5)]: "is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means."

AND,

2) the statement must be:

"A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it

> to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."
>
> KRE 804 (b) (3).

Can someone whose identity is absolutely unknown be declared "unavailable" as a witness? If [he] can, can the statements attributable to the anonymous person, made while he was in the process of committing a crime, be admitted under the second requirement?

Although highly dubious, the answer to the first question is, arguably, yes. Cases interpreting this requirement seem to turn on the good faith of the proponent in attempting to secure the attendance of the witness.[23] At this point in the proceedings, the Court has no reason to question [Estes's] good faith in his allegations concerning the assailants or his efforts

to ascertain their identity or obtain their testimony for trial.

The theory of the second requirement is that people don't usually make false statements which put them in jeopardy civilly or criminally. When people make personally incriminating statements, the theory goes that the statements are more likely to be true.

In this case the statements do not put the unknown assailant in any additional jeopardy. He is in the process of committing a crime. Statements tending to show who may have employed him or may be a co-conspirator add little or nothing to his potential jeopardy. The fact that the identity of the declarant(s) remains anonymous and that two statements were made pointing to "Dougie" during separate assaults detracts from the trustworthiness of all of the statements. Assuming that the facts are precisely as stated by [Estes], why should anyone believe that the statements of the anonymous assailants are true? What are their indicia of reliability? There are no corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statements. The Court concludes that this hearsay exception is inapplicable.

On appeal, Estes points to the deposition of Willis Shores as providing the corroborating circumstances required by KRE 804 (b)

(3). Shores stated that he was on the telephone with Estes during the second attack when he heard someone ring Estes's doorbell and say, "Mr. Estes" and "sent you a Christmas present." This was followed by shuffling noises, Estes saying loudly, "Get out of here," and finally a dial tone. Shores's testimony does not supply the corroborating circumstances required for a statement against penal interest. The similar requirement of "coorborating circumstances [that] clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement" for the admissibility of hearsay statements against penal interest[24] under the FRE 804 (b) (3) has generally been interpreted to require corroboration of the truthfulness of the declarant's statement rather than the veracity of the witness relaying the statement.[25] We hold that this is also the appropriate interpretation of KRE 804 (b) (3). "As a matter of standard hearsay analysis, the credibility of the in-court witness regarding the fact that the statement was made is not an appropriate inquiry."[26] This is because the witness relaying the declarant's statement is available for cross-examination, which will presumably reveal any lack of credibility, memory, or perception on the part of the witness,[27] while the declarant is not available for

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27 Id. n.28.

28 As noted, KRE 804 (b) (3) only applies if the declarant is unavailable, as defined by KRE 404 (a).

29 Estes does not challenge the circuit court's conclusion that the assailant's statement also fails the first component of the test for admissibility as a statement against jeopardy. Therefore, we affirm on this basis, as well.

30 See, e.g., DAVID F BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 2.02 at 18-19 (3d ed. 1991). But see Wisconsin v. Kutz, 671 N.W.2d 660, 676 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that cases relied upon for these treatises often do not entirely rule out the possibility of an assertive directive or question.

31 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250 at 122 n.29; Kutz, 671 N.W. 2d at 564-566.

cross-examination.[28] At most, Shores can corroborate that Estes accurately reported what the declarant said. But Shores's testimony offers no support for the truthfulness of the declarant's statement, which is what is required under KRE 804 (b) (3). Thus, we affirm the circuit court's ruling that this hearsay statement cannot be admitted as a statement against penal interest because it lacks the required corroboration.[29]

"YOU KNOW THE DRILL."

Estes alleges that during the third assault, the assailant told him, "You know the drill." This meets the first requirement of hearsay; it is a statement within the meaning of KRE 801 (a) because it is an oral assertion. If this statement were to be offered for its truth--it would be inadmissible. However, Estes sought to offer this statement as circumstantial evidence showing a common assailant based on the assailant's knowledge that Estes had been assaulted in a similar fashion on previous occasions. This is a non-hearsay use. Therefore, we find that the circuit court erred in deeming the statement, "You know the drill," as hearsay and, consequently, excluding it. Because it is not hearsay, it is presumptively admissible. However, the directed verdict was entered against Estes because he could link the assaults in any way to Bullock. Merely being able to show a common assailant in all three assaults would not help Estes establish this connection. Therefore, we find that the exclusion of the statement, "You know the drill," be harmless error.

"GO TELL DOUGIE WE HAVE GOT HIM."

Estes asserts that during the first assault, one assailant said to the other, "Go tell Dougie we have got him." This utterance is a command, an instruction. Some treatises assert that commands, like questions, cannot be statements within the meaning of FRE 801 (a), or presumably KRE 801(a), because they make no assertion of fact or opinion.[30] But this categorical approach has been rejected by many courts and legal scholars as artificial and unduly formalistic.[31] We also find this approach inconsistent with the focus placed on the intent of the speaker under KRE 801(a). It is illogical to make the grammatical form of an utterance--whether it is a declarative sentence, command/instruction, or question--dispositive in determining whether the speaker intended to make an assertion within the meaning of KRE 801(a).[32]

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32 See Kutz, 671 N.W.2d at677-678.

33 By using the term "implicit assertion," we seek to distinguish this matter from the common law concept of "implied assertion." Under the common law, some courts treated the inferences drawn form nonverbal conduct, which the actor did not necessarily intend to be assertive, as hearsay, relying on the action's so-called "implied assertion." The consensus among most legal scholars is that an inference arising from such nonassertive, nonverbal conduct is no longer treated as hearsay under the modern rules of evidence but, rather, as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue. BINDER, § 2.05 at 111-113. But see, Wheeler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 121 S.W.3c 173, 183 (2003) (assuming, without any analysis of the eyewitness's intent, that a police officer's reference to an eyewitness's lack of hesitation in identifying the implied assertion that the eyewitness was positive of the identification). Because this case does not involve nonassertive, nonverbal conduct, the law on "implied assertion" has no bearing.

34 E.g., United States v. Zenni, 492 F.Supp. 464, 469 (E.D.Ky. 1980); United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990).

35 See Kutz, 671 N.W.2d at 678 n.21 (listing various state positions on this issue). The Kutz case in general presents a scholarly, thorough, and well-written analysis on the issue of implicit verbal assertions, ultimately holding that implicit verbal assertions may be hearsay statements under Wisconsin's evidentiary rules. Id. at 673-681.

36 Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 432-435 (1983).

Any assertion contained in the command, "Go tell Dougie we have got him," is necessarily indirect or implicit. The Kentucky courts have not specifically addressed whether "assertion" in the definition of "statement" in KRE 801 (a) is broad enough to include and implicit assertion.[33] As previously noted, intent is the touchstone of whether an utterance is a statement within the meaning of KRE 801(a). Can on intend to assert a matter of fact or opinion indirectly or implicitly? Some courts considering this issue have merely assumed that a so-called implicit assertion cannot be an intentional assertion and, thus, cannot be a hearsay statement.[34] However, we join the majority of state courts,[35] as well as the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,[36] in rejecting this proposition. We reject this too-narrow definition of "assertion." Its plain meaning encompasses more than merely communicating through simple, declarative sentences. One who states, "It will stop raining in an hour," asserts, or intentionally communicates, the message that it is

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37 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 250 at 111-112 n. 29 (noting that the utterance "it will stop raining in an hour," is hearsay when it is offered to prove that it is raining because, "the fact to be proved is necessary implication of the utterance.") See also Tennessee v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 526 n.5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

38 Kutz, 671 N.W.2d at 679-680.

39 LAWSON § 8.05[5] at 570

40 Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 221-222 (1996).

41 The evidence at issue concerned a witness's testimony, based on personal observation that the victim acted afraid of the defendant, which was offered to show that the victim feared the defendant. The defendant sought to exclude this on the grounds that it was the equivalent of letting the witness testify that the victim had said, "I am afraid of the defendant." The court rejected the defendant's argument because there was no evidence that the victim intended to make such an assertion through her action. Id.

42 Id. at 680. See also, United States v. Jackson, 88 F.3d 845, 548 (10th Cir. 1996).

43 LAWSON § 8.05 [5] at 570.

raining now as clearly as if that person had said, "It is raining now, but it will stop in an hour."[37] Thus, it would be absurd to treat only the latter and not the former statement as hearsay when offered to prove the truth that it is raining now.

This leads to the following questions: how to determine whether a speaker intends to make an implicit assertion and, if so, how to determine what that implicit assertion is. In answering these questions, the Michigan Court of Appeals[38] found guidance in the following framework, suggested by the Advisory Committee Note on FRE 801 (a) on how to determine whether nonverbal conduct is intended as an assertion:

> When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a preliminary determination will be required to determine whether an assertion is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved against him in favor of admissibility. The determination involves no greater difficulty than many other preliminary questions of fact.

We agree with the Wisconsin court that this framework also addressed the appropriate way to determine whether an utterance contains an implicit statement. Moreover, it is consistent with the approach that the Kentucky Supreme Court has already taken with

respect to nonverbal conduct.[39] For example, in the case of Partin v. Commonwealth,[40] the Kentucky Supreme Court seemed to place the burden of trying to prove that nonverbal conduct contained an implicit assertion on the party seeking to have the nonverbal conduct deemed a hearsay statement and, hence, presumptively inadmissible.[41] We think that the burden lies with the party claiming that the speaker intended to and did make a particular expression of fact, opinion, or condition.[42] This is consistent with the policy embodied in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence "to tilt the law toward admission over exclusion."[43] The trial court should then determine the admissibility of the utterance containing the alleged implicit assertion.[48] Sometimes it will be clear from the utterance itself that the speaker must have intended an implicit assertion.[49] For example, the implicit assertion in "Joe, why did you steal that car?" is apparent. But "when evidence of surrounding circumstances is needed to resolve the issue, the party claiming an implicit assertion must present that evidence to the trial court."[50]

An example of a situation in which the implicit message within an utterance is only revealed by evidence of surrounding circumstances is found in the case of Brown v. Virginia.[51] The

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[48] Kutz at 600; Land, 34 S.W.3d at 526 (noting that "[w]hen an utterance is offered on the theory that it is not a statement, and hence, not hearsay, a preliminary determination is required to determine whether an assertion is intended").
[49] 487 S.E.2d 248.
[50] Brown, 487 S.E.2d at 251.
[51] Id. at 252.

defendant in this rape case twice asked a police officer at the police station after his arrest, "Does Peggy [the rape victim] know I'm here?"[52] The court held that through these questions the defendant intended to make the implicit assertions that he and Peggy had a personal relationship.[53] However, the court reached this conclusion, in part, based on the fact that the speaker's defense was that he and the victim were involved in a relationship and had engaged in consensual sex.[54] This was in sharp contrast to the victim's story that the defendant was a stranger who broke into her home and raped her.[55] The court interpreted the defendant's questions as implicitly assertive, in part, because they appeared to be attempts to bolster his defense theory.[56]

We must now consider whether the particular utterance, "Go tell Dougie we have got him," makes an implicit assertion and, if so, what it is. The implicit assertion that "we [the assailants] have got him [Estes]," appears to be an obvious and intentional assertion by the speaker. However, Estes did not seek to offer this statement for its truth, to show that the assailants had control over him. The exclusion of this particular implicit statement as hearsay was erroneous. But because this statement does not assist Estes in establishing the needed link between Bullock and Carpenter, it is harmless error.

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[52] Id. at 250-252.

[55] Id. at 250-251, 253.
[56] Id. at 252.

Estes asserts that the assailant's reference to "Dougie," as in "Go tell Dougie. . .," is the equivalent of the assailant stating that "Dougie sent us." The circuit court seems to have accepted this as true. It held that the statement was inadmissible because it was offered for the truth asserted, to show that Doug Bullock was behind the attack. The conclusion that this passing reference to Dougie was intended by the speaker to implicitly assert that Bullock was behind the attack is by no means a foregone one. Some courts have held that a speaker's reference to another's name does not ordinarily demonstrate intent on the part of the speaker to identify or introduce that other person.[57] However, we note that the meaning of this particular utterance must be considered in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Estes asserts that the same assailant spoke all three utterances at issue. Given the commonality of the attacks, and the fact that the speaker was allegedly the same in each instance, it is not illogical to examine the other utterances for any light that they may shed on the speaker's intent in referring to "Dougie" in the first assault. During the second assault, the assailant expressly tried to place blame on Bullock, saying, "Mr. Estes, Doug Bullock has sent you a Christmas present." In light of this demonstrated intent to implicate Doug Bullock, it is possible to interpret the same assailant's words in the same intent. While we might not have reached the same conclusion, under these circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court's conclusion—that the assailant uttering,

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[57] See, e.g., Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 882 (D.C. 1992) (holding that defendant who shouted, "No, Marvin," when his co-defendant moved to shoot a security guard did not intend to identify his codefendant as Marvin or make any assertion; thus, the utterance was

"Go tell Dougie we got him," intended to assert that "Dougie [Doug Bullock] sent us" –is clearly erroneous. Given this fact, we find that the circuit court properly excluded this statement as inadmissible hearsay since Estes sought to offer it for the truth of the matter, as proof that the assailants were sent by Doug Bullock.

Because Estes fails to establish any connection to Bullock, his claims that Carpenter should be liable for Bullock's role in orchestrating the assaults similarly fails. Carpenter cannot be liable for something (here, Bullock's involvement in the assaults) that has no evidence to support it. The liability of the other individual defendants also seems to be premised on Bullock's role in the assaults, so the claims against these defendants similarly fail.

THE REST OF ESTES'S CLAIMS

Our lengthy analysis above has not resolved all of Estes's claims. We must, therefore, separately address his claims regarding Carpenter's own liability, insofar as we can determine what those allegations are despite Estes's briefs. Estes alleges that Carpenter failed to investigate sufficiently the first assault and take corrective action in order to prevent the second and third assaults. The circuit court correctly ruled that to the extent Estes employed any theories of liability based on negligence, for example, negligent hiring of Bullock, negligent supervision of Bullock, and a negligent failure to provide a safe workplace, Estes's avenue of relief is limited to

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not a statement for purposes of hearsay and was presumptively admissible). See also BINDER § 2.02 AT 18-19.

workers' compensation by the exclusive remedy provision of KRS 342.690(1).[58]

Estes seeks to avoid operation of the exclusive remedy provision by recasting his claim as one alleging prohibited age discrimination.[59] However, contrary to his assertion on appeal, he fails to establish a *prima facie* showing of prohibited discrimination. Estes correctly asserts that according to Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., [60] he is required to show that (1) he is a member of a protected class (here, over age 40); (2) he was otherwise qualified for the position; (3) he received an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by a younger person. But Estes fails in his showing of an adverse employment action. He argues that the assault he suffered at Carpenter satisfies this element. However, in order for the assault to be considered an adverse employment action, more is required than simply that it occurred while he was working. He has to show some connection between the assault and his employer. As explained above, Estes has not demonstrated any such connection. Absent any evidence to connect the assault to Carpenter, it cannot be considered an adverse employment action for the purpose of age discrimination claim.

DISPOSITION OF ESTES'S APPEAL

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[58] See also Adkins v. R. & S Body Co., Ky., 58 S.W.3d 428, 430 (2001); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 459, 462-464 (1986).

[59] KRS 344.040.

[60] 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed2d. 105 (2000). Reeves deals with the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. However, because there are few cases interpreting KRS 344.040, and the Kentucky statute was modeled after the federal statute, it is appropriate to resort to federal interpretation.

The Circuit Court was correct to direct a verdict in favor of the appellees in this legal quagmire. Its judgment is affirmed.

DISPOSITION OF THE CROSS-APPEAL

Our affirmance of the trial court's judgment renders the issues raised on cross-appeal moot. So the cross-appeal is dismissed as such.

VANMETER, JUDGE CONCURS.

COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

Minton, VanMeter, and Combs.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO. 00-CI-00341

COREN ESTES PLAINTIFF

vs. **JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS**

CARPENTER COMPANY, JIM GUTHRIE, JOHNNY MCGUIRE and DOUG BULLOCK DEFENDANTS

A jury was selected and sworn to try this case on Thursday, October 10, 2002. After opening statements the Plaintiff was called to testify.

Toward the end of the first day counsel for Plaintiff was permitted to interrupt the testimony of the Plaintiff and called Dr. Rick Bennett.

The Plaintiff had intended to utilize the deposition of Dr. Bennett rather than present him live at trial but the Court had ruled on Monday, October 7, that the opinion testimony in the deposition was inadmissible because it was not couched in terms of reasonable medical probability. It was instead to the effect that certain of the Plaintiff's medical symptoms might have or could have been worsened by the three alleged assaults upon the Plaintiff – within reasonable medical probability.

The Court ruled that the Plaintiff could present the Doctor's testimony live at trial provided that his opinions were couched in terms of reasonable medical probability. Unfortunately, his live testimony was substantially the same and he was not permitted to

give the proffered testimony. This eliminated the Plaintiff's ability to introduce evidence of most of the damages he was claiming.

The Court had ruled before trial that the Plaintiff could pursue no claim based upon a theory of negligence since this was barred by the Workers Compensation Statute. He was left to pursue only the intentional torts of assault and the statutory civil rights claim of age discrimination.

The direct examination of Coren Estes outlined a history of personal conflict between he and Doug Bullock and outlined three occasions where Coren was assaulted by persons whose identity remains anonymous. He did not contend that any of the Defendants actively participated in the alleged assaults but seemed to believe that they were somehow responsible. Coren's testimony, together with statements made by his counsel, caused the Court to suspect that the basis of the claim that the Defendants were legally negligence or, in any event, that there may be no evidence available connecting the Defendants with any of the alleged assaults.

Coren Estes asserted that he was assaulted on three occasions. The first occurred in August of 1999, one day prior to his planned retirement, on the premises of his employer, Carpenter Company, and was carried out by two masked men at gunpoint; He was thereafter assaulted in the same manner by one of the same unknown men at his home in December of 2001 and again in April of 2002; On each of the three occasions he was forced to drink a green liquid alleged to contain doxylamine, an antihistamine found in over the counter medications such as Unisom.

He claimed that Carpenter Company by and through Johnny McGuire and Jim Guthrie failed to adequately investigate various instances of harassment against him and finally that Doug Bullock was intentionally harassing him by leaving letters, an e-mail, an obscene cartoon and other written notes in the workplace.

Coren said that he believed that the harassment by Bullock was initially based on workplace competition but inferred that at some point it was based upon his age. He also said that the failure to investigate his allegations of harassment were based upon his age. The reasons he suspected that these matters were based upon his age were clear. He was not discharged or demoted and his only substantial damages appear to be medical bills arising from the alleged assaults.

There were no eyewitnesses to the assault which took place during 2nd shift on the premises of Carpenter Company and Mr Estes described how anyone could have entered or left the premises unnoticed.

At the conclusion of his testimony on direct examination, neither he nor his counsel had alluded to any evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that any of the Defendants were in any way directly responsible for the assaults. There was no purported direct or circumstantial evidence to the effect that any of the Defendants or any representative of Carpenter Company had been seen associating with men matching the description of either of the alleged anonymous attackers or that any Defendant had conspired to solicit an assault upon the Plaintiff.

If assumed true in every respect, this Court believes that the evidence presented would, as a matter of law, be insufficient to find legal liability against any of the Defendants for the intentional tort of assault.

Toward the conclusion of the direct testimony of Coren Estes on the second day of trial, the Court informed Plaintiff's counsel (out of the presence of the jury) that it suspected that there was a complete lack of evidence connecting the Defendants with the alleged assaults and the Defendants be put on immediately following the cross examination of Coren Estes.

This ruling was considered because the Plaintiff had listed more than 50 witnesses. Presumably, some would be called to testify concerning the assaults, some to prove incidents of harassment by Doug Bullock and reports of harassment made by Coren Estes and others to prove damages resulting from the assaults. It would be senseless to waste days of trial time proving these facts if the Plaintiff lacked any substantial proof on this critical issue. The Court's inherent power to control the order of proof includes the power to direct that proof concerning certain issues be presented before others.

Counsel was warned that the failure to present some proof of a connection between the assailants and the Defendants would result in a directed verdict o the issue of intentional assault. Plaintiff's counsel was requested to describe any such evidence on the record and was unable to do so. She did say "it's circumstantial" but could not describe the purported evidence other than those facts described above.

At the conclusion of the cross examination, Plaintiff's counsel was again questioned at the bench and still could not describe the other specific evidence connecting the Defendants with the alleged attackers and the Court ordered that any such evidence be produced immediately following the Plaintiff's testimony and reemphasized that if no such evidence could be produced the Court would direct a verdict.

Counsel for Plaintiff next called a witness named Bob Brown and attempted to establish the character of Defendant, Doug Bullock, for having a bad temper. The stopped the testimony and, following additional colloquy at the bench (which again confirmed the inability of Plaintiff to produce any evidence on the issue as ordered), sua sponte directed a verdict in favor of the Defendants dismissing all claims.

The claim concerning age discrimination was dismissed because it too depends upon damages resulting from the assaults. The theory of Plaintiff's counsel is this: had the Defendants not intentionally discriminated against Coren Estes by failing to investigate fully the allegations of harassment, then the assaults and resulting damage would not have occurred. The jury cannot be permitted to speculate. The admitted inability of the Plaintiff to prove who committed the assaults or why is an absolute barrier to winning on this theory.

This Court is fully aware that directed verdicts are usually granted only at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party. Rule 50.01 recognizes the right of a party to move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence. However, whenever

during the course of a trial it becomes clear that a party cannot prevail on a cause of action, the Court has the inherent power to grant a directed verdict. See, e.g., Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Company, 37 S.W.3rd 770 (Ky App. 2000). Otherwise, the Court and jury might literally be held hostage for days while a party puts on evidence irrelevant to the issue requiring the directed verdict. In this case counsel for Plaintiff was apparently engaging in a filibuster with character evidence unrelated to the issue of concern to the Court.

This is a final and appealable Judgment, there being no just reason for delay in entry.

Defendants are awarded their costs.

ENTER: This 15th day of October, 2002.

S\Tyler L. Gill
Tyler L. Gill, Judge
Logan Circuit Court

Entered: October 16, 2002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO. 00-CI-00341

COREN ESTES PLAINTIFF

vs. **ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER, AMEND OR VACATE**

CARPENTER COMPANY, JIM GUTHRIE, JOHNNY MCGUIRE and DOUG BULLOCK DEFENDANTS

Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate denied. This is a final and appealable Judgment.

ENTER: This 13th day of December, 2002.

S\Tyler L. Gill
Tyler L. Gill, Judge
Logan Circuit Court

Entered: December 13, 2002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO. 00-CI-00341

COREN ESTES PLAINTIFF

vs. **ORDER CONCERNING ADMISSIBILITY OF PROFFERED EVIDENCE**

CARPENTER COMPANY, JIM GUTHRIE, JOHNNY MCGUIRE and DOUG BULLOCK DEFENDANTS

On Tuesday September 3, 2001, counsel presented argument concerning defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court discussed with Counsel various pretrial issues. The jury trial was rescheduled for October 10, 2002. Counsel for Plaintiff has since tendered jury instructions and the Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's MEMORANDUM REGARDING HEARSAY STATEMENTS. This order resolves the hearsay issue and addresses another issue which may be looming concerning expert opinions concerning alleged "delusions."

HEARSAY ISSUE

Plaintiff intends to introduce at trial statements of anonymous persons allegedly made on three different occasions and each made simultaneously, or nearly so, to physical assaults upon the Plaintiff. These statements are: "Go tell Dougie, we have got him" made during the August 11, 1999 assault; "Mr. Estes, Doug Bullock has sent you a Christmas present" made during the December 19, 2001 assault; and, "you know the drill" made during the March 18, 2002 assault.

The hearsay rule generally prohibits introduction into evidence of out of court statements proffered for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements. The logic of this rule is grounded in the fact that such statements are considered inherently unreliable and there is often no way to test the trustworthiness of the statement by cross examination.

There are several established exceptions to this rule, some of which apply whether or not the declarant is available to be cross examined at trial and some of which can only apply when the declarant is deemed "unavailable" to give the proffered testimony. See, KRE 803 and 804, respectively.

In addition, out of court statements may be admitted for a non-hearsay purpose (for a reason other than to prove the truth of the statement). In these instances, the fact that a statement was made, whether or not the statement was true, is relevant to some issue in the case.

Plaintiff first argues that the proffered statements are non-hearsay (not offered to prove that Doug Bullock was involved in the assaults) and should be admissible to prove Coren Estes' state of mind at the time of the attacks. This is ludicrous. First, The statements are not alleged to have been made by him and would not reflect his state of mind. Second, his state of mind is not relevant to any claim or defense in this case. No one is claiming that he was the aggressor in assaulting the anonymous attackers rather than the reverse. The proffered statements have no conceivable relevance to this case other than their tendency to prove some connection between the physical assaults and Doug Bullock.

Plaintiff next argues that the statements fall under a hearsay exception as a Statement Against Penal Interest pursuant to KRE 804(b)(3). Under this exception two requirements must be met. The first is meant to establish the necessity of the proffered testimony and the second is designed to establish its trustworthiness.

Under this rule the declarant must be:

1) "unavailable" as a witness as defined by KRE 804 (a). Under this rule, "unavailability as a witness" includes the situation in which the declarant (the only possible applicable subsection is KRE 804 (a) (5)): "Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process and other reasonable means."

AND

2) the statement must be:
"A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability....that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." KRE 804 (b) (3)

Can someone whose identity is absolutely unknown be declared "unavailable" as a witness? If they can, can the statements attributable to the anonymous person, made while he was in the process of committing a crime, be admitted under the second requirement?

Although, highly dubious, the answer to the first question is, arguably, yes. Cases interpreting this requirement seem to turn on the good faith of the witness. See, e.g., Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook Section 8.45 IV (third edition) (1993), At this point in the proceedings, the Court has no reason to question the Plaintiff's good faith in his allegations concerning the assailants or his efforts to ascertain their identity or obtain their testimony for trial.

The theory of the second requirement is that people don't usually make false statements which put them in jeopardy civilly or criminally. When people make personally incriminating statements, the theory goes that the statements are more likely to be true.

In this case the statements do not put the unknown Assailant in any additional jeopardy. He is in the process of committing a crime. Statements tending to show who may have employed him or may be a co-conspirator add little or nothing to his potential jeopardy. The fact that the identity of the declarant(s) remains anonymous and that two statements were made pointing to "Dougie" during separate assaults detracts from the trustworthiness of all of the statements. Assuming that the facts are precisely as stated by the Plaintiff, why should anyone believe that the statements of the anonymous assailants are true? What are their indicia of reliability? There are no corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statements. The Court concludes that this hearsay exception is inapplicable.

It is ordered that the statements at issue be excluded from evidence as hearsay.

EXPERT TESTIMONY CONCERNING ISSUE OF DELUSIONS

Counsel have also discussed the fact that the Plaintiff has been examined by one or more Psychiatrist or Psychologist and have inferred that these persons may give expert testimony at trial. In order to avoid the possibility of unnecessary expense, counsel are advised that the Court is not presently inclined to permit expert testimony giving an opinion as to whether Coren Estes is or was delusional or that his testimony is not true, if any part of that opinion is based upon the factual conclusion or "probability" that the events he alleges did not take place. Whether the assaults took place as alleged by Coren Estes may be an issue at trial and the jury is capable of making this factual determination. This appears to be a part of the basis of opinion of Scott E. Ruder, M.D. who performed an "IME." The expert conclusion that, if the assaults did not take place, then Coren Estes is delusional seems unlikely to assist the jury in addressing the issues. A discussion of this issue appears in section 4.35 of The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook by Robert G. Lawson.

Enter, this 10th day of September, 2002.

S\Tyler L. Gill
Tyler L. Gill, Judge
Logan Circuit Court

Entered: September 10, 2002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO. 00-CI-00341

COREN ESTES PLAINTIFF

vs. **PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER**

CARPENTER COMPANY, JIM GUTHRIE, JOHNNY MCGUIRE and DOUG BULLOCK DEFENDANTS

PTC [Pre-Trial Conference] conducted.

Jury Trial continued to 10/10 [02].

Parties informed that JT [jury trial] would not take place if it (trial) resulted in continuance of any criminal case (Particularly where defendant was incarcerated).

Motion for SJ [Summary Judgment] taken under submission.

Plaintiff to file Jury Instruction by Thursday.

Sanctions (ordered) imposed against counsel for Plaintiff in amount of $100.00 to paid to officer (Detective) Kenneth Edmunds within 30 days for improper use of judicial process (Subpoena) for purpose of requesting production of audio tape & vile where no judicial proceeding was anticipated. – See tape.

S\Tyler L. Gill
Tyler L. Gill, Judge
Logan Circuit Court

Entered: September 10, 2002

STATUTES INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment V

Criminal actions; Provisions concerning; Due process of law and just compensation clauses. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy or life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

United State Constitution, Amendment XIV

Section 1. Citizenship; Due process; Equal Protection.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Kentucky Revised Statutes, Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.040

Discrimination by employers.- It is an unlawful practice for an employer:

(1) To fail or refuse to hire, or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual's disability, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, **age** between forty (40) and seventy (70), or because the individual is a smoker or nonsmoker, as long as the person complies with any workplace policy concerning smoking.

(2) To limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect status as an employee, because of the individual's disability, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or **age** between forty (40) and seventy (70), or because the individual is a smoker or nonsmoker, as long as the person complies with any workplace policy concerning smoking; or

(3) To require as a condition of employment that any employee or applicant for employment abstain from smoking or using tobacco product outside the course of employment, as long as the person complies with any workplace policy concerning smoking.

(2)

No. 05-850

FILED
MAR 8 - 2006
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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

CORENESTES,

Petitioner,

v.

CARPENTER COMPANY, JIM GUTHRIE, JOHNNY MEGUIAR, and DOUG BULLOCK,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The Kentucky Court Of Appeals

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Petitioner presents for this Court's review questions as to whether certain evidentiary rulings and a directed verdict rendered by a Kentucky trial court, and affirmed by a unanimous Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a lawsuit brought by Petitioner pursuant to Kentucky law were "clearly erroneous and a lack of due process."

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Respondents state that Respondent Carpenter Company is a privately held corporation with no parent company. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of the Company's stock.

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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents Carpenter Company, Jim Guthrie, Johnny Meguiar and Doug Bullock respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking review of the November 19, 2004 Opinion Affirming rendered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.[1]

JURISDICTION

This Court cannot properly exercise jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257. Despite Petitioner's citation to a federal case in his Jurisdictional Statement, Petitioner has never asserted that federal law forms the basis for his age discrimination claim, which he filed and pursued exclusively under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.[2] Petitioner's unsupported and unspecified references to "due process," made for the first time in his Petition, are glaringly insufficient to invoke this High Court's jurisdiction.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the Kentucky trial and appellate courts, Petitioner expended hour upon hour, page upon page presenting

[1] Because the Opinion attached to the Petition is not an accurate reproduction of what the Court of Appeals rendered on November 19, 2004, Respondents must include a second, correct copy as an Appendix to this Brief in Opposition. Petitioner's proffered copy of the trial court judgment directing verdict also deletes key wording – sometimes substantial parts of sentences – and cannot be relied upon by this Court. Respondents attach a correct, verbatim copy of the Judgment for Defendants in their Appendix.

[2] KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344 *et seq.* (Michie 2005) (hereinafter "KRS 344").

immaterial, grossly speculative and blatantly inadmissible information and theories. In directing verdict, the trial court characterized Petitioner's so-called proof as a "filibuster" [App. 27]. In its 23-page Opinion Affirming, the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that Petitioner "has barraged this Court with endless facts," none of which implicate Respondents [App. 3 n.6]. The same can be said of his Petition to this Court. The Petition is fraught with misrepresentations and fails to provide an accurate account of the trial and why the trial judge was compelled to direct a verdict when Petitioner's counsel finally admitted that there was no evidence to support Petitioner's claims. Respondents therefore must respectfully submit this counter-statement of the case.

Petitioner, Coren Estes, worked as a lead person in the bale room on the second shift at the Respondent Carpenter Company in Russellville, Kentucky, from September 6, 1986, until his retirement on August 12, 1999. Respondents Jim Guthrie and Johnny Meguiar held managerial positions at Carpenter Company at the time of the alleged events, which are the bases of Petitioner's claims. Respondent Doug Bullock was also a lead person at Carpenter, like Petitioner, but on the preceding shift.

Petitioner alleges that he was assaulted on three occasions, all unwitnessed, by individuals he cannot connect to the Respondents. He alleges that these individuals forced him to drink a liquid from a cup that caused him to become unconscious. He says the first incident occurred at Carpenter on August 11, 1999, the day before his last day at work before his planned retirement, and involved two assailants. The second alleged incident occurred on December 19, 2001, and the third on March 18, 2002. According to Petitioner, the second and third

incidents involved only one assailant and happened at his home over two years after his retirement from the Carpenter Company.

The identities of the assailants are unknown and Petitioner has no admissible evidence linking them to any of the Respondents other than his testimony that: (1) the first incident occurred at work; and (2) the unknown assailant in the second and third incidents was one of the two unknown assailants involved in the first incident. As for his clearly inadmissible hearsay evidence, Petitioner says that: (1) one of the assailants from the first incident made a reference to "Dougie"; (2) the sole assailant from the second incident made a reference to "Bullock"; and (3) the sole assailant in the third incident stated "you know the drill."

Petitioner brought this action, which the Petition calls an "age discrimination case," in Kentucky state court based on three state-law claims. First, he asserted that company managers Meguiar and Guthrie – and Carpenter itself (through *respondeat superior*) – discriminated against him because of his age in violation of KRS 344 and "failed to investigate about his complaints." Second, he asserted that they deprived him of a safe working environment. Petitioner alleged as his third count that former co-worker Doug Bullock subjected him to "frequent and extremely offensive threats and harassments." Twenty months later Petitioner amended his Complaint, adding the second and third incidents to his factual allegations, and an assault count to his causes of action. Petitioner alleged in his Amended Complaint that all the assaults were perpetrated by individuals known to the Respondents or by their employees or agents, and that Carpenter was negligent in hiring and retaining Bullock.

Pre-trial Admissions. Early in the discovery phase of the litigation, Petitioner moved the trial court for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Respondents from having any contact with him. During the hearing on that motion, Petitioner's counsel admitted to the trial court that the assailants were **not employees or agents of any of the Respondents**. The trial court overruled the motion based on the fact that Petitioner was unable to connect the assaults to any of the Respondents. This was a fatal lapse in proof he was never able to fill, despite his counsel's disingenuous assurances to the trial court to the contrary, and one that would later give the trial court no choice but to direct a defense verdict at trial.

Discovery did nothing to support Petitioner's cause. The only telling fact to emerge was that Petitioner does not like Bullock. Indeed, much of Petitioner's own deposition was devoted to explaining the intense rivalry between the two co-workers over whose shift was the most productive. At the close of discovery, the record contained no probative evidence of wrongdoing by the Respondents. Indeed, the record confirmed that all Petitioner had to support some connection between the Respondents and his alleged assaults was Petitioner's "belief" that Bullock hired "henchmen" to do the deeds. As for Petitioner's claim of age discrimination, which he theorized contributed to the assaults, there was no evidence of any age-related conduct by any Respondent. Accordingly, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment.

The trial court refused to dismiss the action on Respondents' motion, applying an overly restrictive standard that summary judgments are virtually impossible to obtain in Kentucky, even when, as here, there is no evidence of record to support the legal theories asserted. The

trial court did dismiss Petitioner's negligence claims as being precluded by Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Act, allowing the case to go forward on Petitioner's intentional claims of assault and KRS 344 violation.

In addition, the trial court ruled that the alleged references by the Petitioner's unknown assailants to "Dougie," "Bullock," and "you know the drill" were inadmissible statements under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, KY. R. EVID. 801 in particular, and excluded any reference to them at trial. After so ruling, the trial court questioned Petitioner's counsel as to whether, without the hearsay, her case was "dead in the water." While admitting that these hearsay statements were "important" to her client's case, counsel assured the court that there was other evidence to support his claims. That representation to the court, like numerous others, turned out to be false.

Also at issue at the pre-trial conference was the admissibility of the deposition of Dr. Rick L. Bennett, a cardiologist who had treated the Petitioner for premature ventricular contractions ("PVCs") and palpitations. Petitioner alleged that during his alleged assaults he was forced to ingest a liquid containing doxylamine, which is an over-the-counter sleeping medication, and that this drug caused his heart disorder. Dr. Bennett testified in his deposition that "it is certainly **conceivable** that this drug **may have** exacerbated his perception of palpitations," but that it did not cause his heart disorder. He was unwilling to testify, however, that it "exacerbated his perception of [palpitations]" within reasonable medical probability. Therefore, the trial court correctly excluded Dr. Bennett's deposition testimony from trial as being incompetent.

Finally, at this conference Petitioner requested permission to introduce into evidence his counsel's written "summary of events," which outlined Petitioner's version of what counsel considered pertinent events in the case. The trial court ruled that counsel could display the summary to the jury in opening statement and closing argument, but precluded it from being introduced as a trial exhibit.[3]

The Trial. The trial commenced on October 10, 2002. Petitioner's counsel advised the court that Dr. Bennett would be present that afternoon to testify in person and requested permission for him to testify out of order. The Judge agreed, but only after Petitioner's counsel **twice** assured the court that Dr. Bennett's opinion at trial would be based on reasonable medical probability, not only on "possibility" as in his deposition. Once again, counsel's representations and assurances regarding this case proved false.

Petitioner took the stand first. During his testimony, however, counsel announced that Dr. Bennett was present and ready to testify. Contrary to counsel's previous assurances, Dr. Bennett continued on the witness stand, as he did in deposition, to frame his opinion regarding any effect the assault liquid could have had on Petitioner's heart problems only in terms of possibility.[4] As soon as that

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[3] Petitioner inaccurately states that the court did not allow the summary "to reach the jury during trial" [Petition p. 15]. He also asserts that this ruling was an abuse of discretion and not due process," [Petition pp. 15-16] but it has nothing to do with the issue of whether the trial court was correct in granting a directed verdict to Respondents.

[4] Respondents are reluctant to do more than mention Dr. Bennett because the trial court's directed verdict and the affirmation by the

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